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Property Settlements and the
Federal Gift Tax-A Survey
This paper is intended as a survey and analysis of the potential
federal gift tax liability created by property settlements incident
to marriage, divorce, and separation. Attention will be given to
the historical development of the applicable tax law, the actual
application of that law, and to some of the problems created by the
latter. It is hoped that the following discussion also makes clear the
necessity for the attorney handling marital difficulties to be familiar
with the federal gift tax law. There are, of course, other tax prob-
lems present in the creation and dissolution of the family unit; these
problems exist primarily in the area of federal income taxation and
are beyond the scope of this survey.'
I. ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
An antenuptial agreement is a contract completed before mar-
riage and pursuant to which one prospective spouse transfers
property to the other.2 The validity, for all but federal tax pur-
poses, rests upon local law.3
The consideration, allegedly supporting these contracts, may
rest on one of two general grounds: (a) One of the parties may be
entering marriage for the second or third time and is unwilling to
subject all his property to the statutory rights which will vest in
his prospective spouse after the wedding. Therefore, in return for
a lump sum settlement prior to marriage (and pursuant to the
antenuptial agreement), the other spouse relinquishes all statutory
property rights in the other's estate prior to the ceremony.4 (b)
I For excellent discussions of income tax problems as related to separation
and divorce see: Powell, Separation and Divorce: Income, Gift and Es-
tate Tax Consequences, Proc. N.Y.U. 15th Ann. Inst. on Fed. Tax 763
(1957); and Comment, Federal Taxation of Alimony Payments and Prop-
erty Settlements, 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 368 (1957).
2 Black Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-105 and §30-106
(Reissue of 1956); Reiger v. Schaible, 81 Neb. 33, 115 N.W. 560 (1908);
Price, Gift Tax Considerations in Divorce Settlements Depend on Section
2516, 3 J. Taxation 367 (1955); and Lindey, Separation Agreements and
Ante-Nuptial Contracts 782 (1953).
3 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-106 (Reissue 1956); In re Estate of Maag, 119 Neb.
237,243, 228 N.W. 537 (1930); Lindey, op. cit. supra note 2 at 784.
4 Commissioner v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1941), reversing Bennet B.
Bristol, 42 B.T.A. 263 (1940).
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One spouse may lose a right to certain income or property, estab-
lished vis-a-vis a prior marriage, if he or she enters into a subse-
quent marriage. Therefore, in return for a lump sum settlement
(and pursuant to the antenuptial agreement), the party who will
suffer the prospective loss enters into the subsequent marriage. 5
Assuming the agreement is completed before marriage, and
the property is transferred, the Commissioner will assert a gift
tax due based upon the full value of the property changing hands.6
The basis for the imposition of this tax is the provision in the Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512, to the effect that transfers without ade-
quate consideration in money or money's worth are subject to
the gift tax.7
In the first context, mentioned as (a) above, taxpayers have
alleged that the release of statutory property rights vesting on
marriage is sufficient consideration in money or money's worth so
as to avoid any gift tax.8 The Commissioner early countered this
argument by asserting that all the settlor received for the property
under such circumstances was love and marriage, and that neither
the release of dower or statutory property rights arising out of
marriage, nor love and affection, were reducible to precise mone-
tary value.9 Unfortunately for the taxpayer the Commissioner's
view has withstood the test of time and is the law today.10
In the second instance mentioned above as (b), the Commis-
sioner has again been successful in imposing a gift tax utilizing the
same analysis; i.e., love and affection is not consideration for this
purpose because it cannot be reduced to money or money's worth.:"
5 Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
0 Subject of course to the annual exclusion of IRC § 2503 (b) and the spe-
cific exemption of IRC § 2521, which are available to the donor spouse.
Also see Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1957).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512 (b) provides: "Where property is trans-
ferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property ex-
ceeded the value of the consideration, shall be deemed a gift, and shall
be included in computing the amount of gifts made during the calendar
year."
S Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
9 Commissioner v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1941); U.S. Treas. Reg.
108 § 86.8 (1943); and Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1957).
10 Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Proposed U.S. Treas. Regulations §
25.2512-8 and § 25.2516-1 (a) (1957); Kutz, Inter Vivos Marital Disposi-
tions, Proc. N.Y.U. 14th Ann. Inst. Fed. Tax 431, 432 (1956).
11 Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
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Note that in the (b) example, it is indeed clear that there is no
quid pro quo in the tax sense. Donee spouse has certainly suffered
a measurable detriment (loss) for which she is reimbursed. Donor
spouse has also suffered a detriment (transferred property), but
his only benefit is love and marriage.' 2 As between Donor and
Donee, Donee is no better nor worse off than she was prior to the
agreement (other than having a new husband), and yet Donor has
parted with something of value and is worse off than before (other
than from the aspect of having a new wife). The only imbalance
of the scale, therefore, is in respect to Donor having transferred
property and received nothing in return (love and marriage can-
celling each other out)-hence, a gift tax should be due.
It is possible, of course, that a given antenuptial agreement
could embrace both of the motives considered as example (a) and
(b), but clearly the argument favoring the imposition of a gift tax
is in no way weakened by such a merger.
A. HISTORY
In the earliest case discussing the taxability of antenuptial
agreements, Commissioner v. Bristol,'3 the Commissioner main-
tained the position that payments under these contracts, in return
for which the wife surrendered certain marital rights, were subject
to the gift tax since no consideration was present. This case, de-
cided in 1941 by the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals, was plainly within
the factual assumption mentioned as type (a) above; the prospec-
tive husband involved desired to retain control of stock in a closely
held family corporation so that upon his death his children by a
prior marriage would acquire the control.14 Here the Court agreed
with the Commissioner, held that a gift tax was due, and said that
consideration as defined in the Revenue Act of 193215 was dis-
similar to common law consideration.' 6 In order for the transfer
to escape tax, said the Court, the wife must replace the husband's
consideration with money of equal value or goods or services capable
of monetary valuation. The wife's mere release of her statutory
12 Id. at 308.
13121 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1941).
'4 Id. at 131.
15 Revenue Act of 1932 § 503, 47 Stat. 247, Int. Rev. Code of 1939. § 1002, 52
Stat. 146, and presently § 2512 of Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
16 For discussion of this consideration concept see Lowndes and Kramer,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 736-740 (1956).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
rights has no market value and cannot be sold, hence there is no
consideration. 17
In 1943, the 7th Circuit in Lasker v. Commissioner"" refused to
follow the Bristol decision. The antenuptial agreement involved
in this case was also within the context of type (a) mentioned
above; it was, however, coupled with a divorce settlement agree-
ment executed only two months after the premarital contract, and
which was later approved by a Nevada divorce court. Here the
court decided that the husband was actually settling an existing
legal liability to the wife and therefore no gift tax was due.19 The
combination of events involved in this case (antenuptial agree-
ment, divorce settlement, and divorce decree) distinguishes it from
the Bristol case setting forth the basic rule on the taxation of ante-
nuptial agreements. The Court construed all three things together,
and decided that since the marriage was terminating the parties
should be allowed a tax-free settlement. Indeed, the Court be-
lieved that the husband had struck a good bargain in making the
divorce settlement, in that the divorced wife might well have se-
cured a larger court judgment which would have been, of course,
a legally binding obligation.2 0 In effect, settlement of a legally en-
forceable obligation constituted consideration. 2'
Yet observe that neither "death" rights nor "divorce" rights in
a husband's property are rights which can be reduced to precise
amounts in advance, and both constitute incipient legal obligations.
Nonetheless, the Court in Lasker was willing to regard a settlement
of inchoate divorce rights as consideration, but the Court in Bristol
held a settlement of "inchoate" death rights was not!
17 121 F.2d at 134.
IS 138 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1943). For discussion of this case see Paul, Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation 711 (1946 Supp.).
TO The Lasker case was followed by a District Court decision in McWilliams
v. Harrison, where the transfer of property in discharge of the wife's sup-
port and marital rights was said to be "... . a bona fide transaction at arm's
length for a full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth
and cannot be taxed as a gift. . . ." CCH 44-1 USTC para. 10,119 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 7, 1944). It is not clear from the opinion whether an antenuptial
agreement or a settlement contract incident to divorce was involved in
this case.
20 Lasker case at 991 stated: "We think there can be no doubt but that pe-
titioner's escape and release from his unfortunate matrimonial adventure
constituted adequate and full satisfaction for the payment thus made. In
fact, it appears that his liability was settled on a bargain basis. Certainly
he was not short-changed." This case in effect foreshadowed the holding
in Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950) and IRC § 2516 both dis-
cussed post § IV.
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Protection of the family unit probably justifies, to a mild de-
gree, the existence of both "death" and "divorce" rights in a spouse's
property, but whatever the soundness of public policy underlying
each, the only manner by which husbands can alter these rights
before they vest (via death or court order, respectively) is through
antenuptial and ante-divorce agreements. It seems strange, there-
fore, that in the former case no consideration is found because in-
choate rights cannot be reduced, in advance, to money or money's
worth (or cannot be sold) ,22 while inchoate divorce rights are held,
In effect, to be subject to such reduction and sale.23 We shall see,
however, that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has, by legislative
fiat (and where logic is not necessarily appropriate) solved the
logical inconsistency in the judge-made law.24
In 1944, the 5th Circuit concluded in Fahs v. Merrill,25 that an
antenuptial agreement of type (a) above, creating a trust for the
prospective wife, was a taxable transfer under the gift tax. Ap-
proximately three months later the 6th Circuit issued its opinion in
Wemyss v. Commissioner.26 In this case the court was faced with an
antenuptial contract of type (b) mentioned above, by which the
transfer of property to the wife under the agreement was to com-
pensate her for the loss of income from a trust established for her
by a former husband. The Court considered the reasoning in the
Lasker case to be pertinent, even though the factual situation was
clearly distinguishable, and held that the transfers by the pre-
marital agreement were not taxable-saying that § 503 of the
Revenue Act of 193227 intended to tax transfers only when a dona-
tive intent existed.28
Wemyss was consistent with Lasker insofar as net result is
concerned-both cases finding no gift tax due on a transfer involv-
ing an antenuptial agreement. But from that point onward, the
cases are strikingly dissimilar. Wemyss involved a type (b) ante-
nuptial settlement whereas Lasker involved a type (a). Further,
Lasker rested, really, upon the divorce settlement and decree being
21 Id. at 992.
22 121 F.2d at 133, 134.
23 138 F.2d at 991.
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 2516, discussed post § IV.
25 142 F. 2d 651 (5th Cir. 1944).
26 144 F. 2d 78 (6th Cir. 1944).
27 47 Stat. 247.
28 144 F.2d at 82. Cf. Commissioner v. Greene, 119 F.2d 383, 386 (9th Cir.
1941).
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present. These elements were not present in Wemyss. It might be
thought that Wemyss and Lasker's consistency could be justified
through the analysis brought forth in the Bristol-Lasker compari-
son. Unfortunately this thread of consistency was not mentioned
in Wemyss. Rather, the Court read into the gift tax statute a re-
quirement that donative intent be present before the transfer could
be taxed-this in spite of the language in the statute taxing all
transfers without consideration in money or money's worth.29
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Wemyss and Merrill cases30 in order to settle the conflicting de-
cisions among the Courts of Appeal, and to establish a definite rule
as to the taxability of antenuptial contracts under the federal gift
tax. The Court reversed the Wemyss case,3' and affirmed the 5th
Circuit opinion in Merrill v. Fahs.32 These companion cases, issued
in 1945, have in effect adopted the Commissioner's early theory that
property transferred under an antenuptial agreement should be
subject to the gift tax, as being a transfer without consideration in
money or money's worth.83
In the Wemyss case, the alleged consideration for the transfer
was the marriage itself and the wife's loss of income from a former
trust (type b). Although this was adequate legal consideration
under the law of Florida, the Court held that it was not enough to
prevent the imposition of a gift tax. In the Merrill case, the con-
sideration was also the marriage itself and the wife's release of her
rights in her husband's property except for maintenance and sup-
port. The Supreme Court again concluded that the transfer was
not for adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.34
The reasoning in the Merrill case was as follows: Ever since
Sanford v. Commissioner,35 the gift tax has been construed to be
supplementary to the estate tax statutes, and the two have been
29 Id. at 81. However the Treas. Reg. 79 Art. 8 (1936) contained the words,
"free from any donative intent" and this was read into the code. The same
phrase is contained in Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1957).
30323 U.S. 686 and 323 U.S. 703.
31324 U.S. 303 (1945), 156 A.L.R. 1022.
32 324 U.S. 308 (1945). Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinions in
both cases.
33 See text at note 13, supra.
34 Merrill case was a 5-4 opinion. Dissenting opinion by Justice Reed ap-
pears at 313 of volume 324; Rabkin and Johnson, Federal Income Gift and
Estate Taxation 5151-5156 (1954).
3.1308 U.S. 39,44 (1939).
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read in pari materia.36 In reviving the gift tax in 1932, Congress
realized that a donor could avoid a gift tax if he claimed that his
gift amounted to a sale, because the donee had given some consider-
ation in return for the gift. Congress therefore attempted to close
the loophole by passing § 503 [former version of IRC § 2512 (b) 1,
and including the words " . . . adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth .... " The estate and gift tax statutes are
to be read in pari materia and have the common phrase "adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth," but the estate
tax statute alone provides in § 812 (b) [former version of IRC §
2043 (b) ] that the relinquishment of marital rights is not consider-
ation.3 7 Nevertheless, the statutes should be similarly construed
and this last sentence of § 812 (b) should be read into the gift tax
section, leading to the construction that the release of marital
property rights under the gift tax is not consideration within the
statute.
Underlying both of the above Supreme Court decisions was
the basic doctrine of "Estate Depletion." The original purpose of
the gift tax was to make certain inter vivos transfers taxable so
that the estate tax could not be evaded through ante-mortem gifts.
Prior to the enactment of the gift tax in 1924, it was possible for a
person to make an inter vivos transfer of property to those who
would take by devise or inheritance if the property were retained
until death, without the payment of any federal tax. Thus, upon
death, the gross amount of the estate would be greatly depleted,
and the government would fail to receive a "proper" amount of
estate tax revenue.3s
It is evident that the presence or absence of donative intent
36 For legislative history of the idea that the gift tax supplements the estate
tax, see: S. Rep. No. 665, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. 40 (1932), and H.R. Rep. No.
708, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. 28 (1932). Black Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951)
defines in pari materia as "upon the same matter or subject." So statutes
which are concerned with the same matter or subject should be con-
strued together. The basis for the doctrine is the desire for systematiza-
tion, for a unified system of taxation, and for a method of avoiding dis-
crepancies between statutes. Lenhoff, Comments, Cases, and Materials on
Legislation 554, 555 (1949).
37 Comment, Tax Aspects of Alimony Trusts, 66 Yale L.J. 881, 885 (1957).
38 Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Commissioner v.
Bristol, supra note 4; 2 Paul, Federal Estate and Gift taxation 962-964(1942). It should be noted parenthetically, that the Estate Depletion theory
has been dealt a serious blow in connection with alleged gifts made pur-
suant to divorce, and a new test has arisen in regard to the same. This
will be discussed below in Section IV.
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with respect to antenuptial agreements after Wemyss and Merrill
is totally irrelevant. Regardless of proof that the contract was
entered into without any donative intent, a gift tax will be imposed
on the ground that the transfer was not for adequate consideration
in money or money's worth.39
B. 1954 CODE
There is no provision in the present IRC which specifically
covers the area of transfers by antenuptial agreement. However,
the substance of the Wemyss and Merrill rules has been incor-
porated into the Proposed U.S. Treasury Regulations, 40 and the
Commissioner has taken the position that a transfer of property in
consideration of marriage or in consideration of the release of
dower, curtesy, or other marital property rights is a taxable gift
even though based upon a binding premarital agreement. The
Regulation states in part that:
A relinquishment of dower or curtesy or of any other marital
rights is not consideration in money or money's worth, and the
transfer of property in return for such a relinquishment constitutes
a gift of the entire value of the property transferred.41
The American Law Institute has taken a position which is con-
sistent with that of the Commissioner in regard to antenuptial
agreements. The Institute's reason was that ". . . ante-nuptial
settlements do not seem to provide the appropriate moment for a
final accounting under the gift tax. If these transfers were freed
of the gift tax it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe
a logical and equitable treatment for further interspousal trans-
fers." 42
A completed antenuptial agreement will create a federal gift
tax liability, therefore;
(a) even though a prospective spouse releases statutory rights
in the property of the other prospective spouse; or
(b) even though a prospective spouse relinquishes valuable in-
come or property to marry; or
39See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. at 313; Wemyss v. Commissioner, 324 U.S.
at 306.
40 Proposed U. S. Treas. Regulations § 25.2512-8 and 25.2516-1 (a) (1957).
41 Proposed U.S. Treas. Regulations § 25.2512-8 (1957).
42 ALI, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Statute (Tent. Draft No. 10 p.
107 1955). Quoted in Warren and Surrey, Federal Estate and Gift Taxa-
tion, Cases and Materials 228 (1956).
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(c) even though no donative intent exists on the part of the
donor spouse, and
(d) even though cases (a) and (b) above would be sufficient
consideration to support a contract under local law.43
C. A PARTIAL SOLUTION
Even though a federal gift tax will be due on a transfer pur-
suant to an antenuptial agreement, when such agreements are de-
sired by the parties entering into a marriage, it is possible to mini-
mize the tax. The key to the tax mitigation lies in the use of the
marital deduction which is, of course, available for gifts between
spouses. The marital deduction provides that one-half of a gift to
a spouse is exempt from tax.4
It has been held that a transfer for federal gift tax purposes
occurs at the moment when all conditions to an antenuptial agree-
ment have been satisfied.45 If an antenuptial contract is, therefore,
made contingent upon marriage, and delivery is postponed until
after the ceremony, the marital deduction will spare one-half of
the transfer from the gift tax. However, if it is merely stated that
delivery is postponed, a gift tax will be imposed upon the whole
amount on the ground that a valid and enforceable contract existed
prior to the marriage.4
II. SUPPORT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
What are the gift tax problems when the wife releases the hus-
band from his duty to support, or when the husband pays an amount
under a divorce or separation agreement for a release of all the
wife's rights-both marital and support? Are these taxable transfers
under the gift tax? To answer these questions, let us look to the
development of the law and then to the 1954 Code.
43 Wolf, Income, Gift and Estate Tax Considerations in Marriage and Di-
vorce, 14 Md. L. Rev. 3,7 (1954); Kutz, op. cit. supra, note 10 at 433,434.
441nt. Rev. Code 1954 § 2523(a).
45 Commissioner v. Copley's Estate, 194 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1952).
40 Ibid. The early case of John D. Archbold, 42 B.T.A. 453 (1940) has been
ignored by the later decision in the Copley case as to the time when a
transfer will be determined to be a present gift. The Archbold case con-
cluded that a promise to make a gift in the future, even though enforce-
able, was not a present gift. See also Durbin, Tax Consequences in Mar-
riage, Separation, and Divorce Settlements, U. Ill. L. Forum 489, 492
(1955).
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A. HISTORY
In Herbert Jones,47 the Commissioner contended by the author-
ity of the Bristol case4" that payments made by the husband pursu-
ant to divorce proceedings, in settlement of the wife's support and
maintenance rights were taxable gifts.49 This was the initial effort of
the Commissioner to tax such transfers, and he was unsuccessful,
the Tax Court ruling that the settlement agreement was an arm's
length business transaction totally without donative intent.50 Two
years later in 1945 the Tax Court followed the above rule and held
in Edmund C. Converse5 that the Wemyss and Merrill Supreme
Court decisions, supra Section I, did not apply as they dealt with
antenuptial agreements. These two early tax court cases were cited
as authority and followed in Matthew Lahti 2 and Clarence B.
Mitchell,53 both decided in January, 1946.
Later in 1946, the Commissioner acquiesced in the above posi-
tion of the Tax Court and published the now famous ET 19.54 The
Commissioner therein distinguished both the Merrill and the We-
myss cases.55 He ruled that a transfer contained in a separation
agreement or divorce decree whereby the wife released support
rights may be full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth to remove it from the gift tax, provided that such transfer did
not exceed the reasonable value of the support rights. However,
the release of marital rights was not such consideration, and if the
transfer were made as a release of both marital and support rights,
the Commissioner would make an allocation.
The Commissioner in ET 19 reasoned that taxability under the
47 Herbert Jones v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1207 (1943).
48 121 F.2d 129 (lst Cir. 1941). This case was distinguished in Jones on the
ground that it involved an antenuptial agreement whereas Jones involved
a settlement agreement incident to divorce.
49 Jones case at 1209.
50 Id. at 1212.
5 5 T.C. 1014, 1016 (1945) (3 judges dissenting) aff'd on other grounds, 163
F.2d 131, 174 A.L.R. 199 (2d Cir. 1947).
52 6 T.C. 7 (1946) (3 judges also dissented).
53 6 T.C. 159 (1946); 2 Rabkin and Johnson, op. cit. supra note 34 at 5153.
5 ET 19- 1946 2 Cum. Bull. 166-169. This was issued by the Commissioner
in reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Wemyss and Mer-
rill. It was expressly made applicable to both the estate and gift taxes.
See Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 16 at 741-43.
55 The Supreme Court's reasoning in these two cases would seem to apply
equally well to marital agreements other than antenuptial types.
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context of the gift tax statute is largely determined by the presence
or absence of financial benefit to the donor. A husband who has a
duty under a decree of divorce or legal separation to support his
"ex"-wife, is under a legal obligation, the satisfaction of which
does not amount to a financial benefit to him.56 Also the payments
under this obligation do not diminish or deplete the husband's
estate any more than the payment of any current debt or expense.57
On the strength of the above arguments, the Commissioner con-
cluded that the surrender of support rights was not among the
"other marital rights" provision of § 812 (b) [former version of
IRC § 2042 (b) ], and therefore the in pari materia argument would
not apply. The Commissioner thereby deftly avoided the construc-
tion used in the Merrill case.58 The 2d Circuit in a series of cases
had taken the position that the right to support was an "other mari-
tal right" and so was not consideration.59 Judge Learned Hand's
dissent in one of the cases was evidently the basis for the ruling in
ET 19.60
Furthermore, the Commissioner was of the opinion that an allo-
cation must be made to determine what part of a transfer contained
in a separation or divorce settlement was in satisfaction of support
rights and what part was in satisfaction of property rights. To the
extent that the transfer was made for the fulfillment of the former,
it was exempt from the gift tax. It was to be the function of the
bureau to make a determination of the reasonable value of the sup-
port rights as a question of fact. The reasonable value was to be
determined by a consideration of the following elements: (a) Hus-
band's income and station in life, (b) The extent of his assets and
the standard of living, (c) The life expectancies of the parties
based on actuarial tables, and (d) The probability of the wife's
remarriage-also based on actuarial principles 1 However, the
G63 Vernier, American Family Laws 108-116 (1935); ALI, Committee on
Continuing Legal Education, Family Law, by Winnett & Gibson, pp. 32
and 62 (1952); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-318 (Reissue 1952).
57 ET 19 supra at 168.
5s Text at notes 35-37 supra.
59 Meyer v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 367 (2nd Cir. 1940); Adriance v. Hig-
gins, 113 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1940); Helvering v. U.S. Trust Co., 111 F.2d
576 (2d Cir. 1940). Cf. Robert McKeon, 25 T.C. 697 (1956). Also see
Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 16 at 318, 319.
GOMeyer v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 367, 369 (1940).
61 ET 19 supra note 54.
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Commissioner's determination is not conclusive and is subject to
review by the courts.62
The rule in the Converse case 63 that payments made under an
order of a divorce court were not taxable as gifts since the incorpor-
ation of the agreement into the decree gave it the character of a
judgment debt was carried forward and expanded in Edward B.
McLean,0 4 and Norman Taurog65 In these two cases, the Tax Court
said that ET 19 was invalid insofar as it did not exempt transfers
made to settle presently enforceable claims.
In 1949, the 2d Circuit, in Commissioner v. Barnard's Estate0
threw some cold water on the expanded notion of the Converse
case, saying that it had "been cited beyond its scope in some deci-
sions below." The Barnard case held that the Converse rule did
not apply to the situation where the settlement was made prior to
the decision to divorce, and the settlement agreement provided that
its terms would be unaffected by inclusion in the separation or
divorce decree. Under this factual situation, the wife's transfer to
the husband by a written agreement whereby he released any claim
on her property was not adequate and full consideration. Important
also was the court's conclusion that there was no business transac-
tion here even though there was a lack of donative intent.
We can see the trend in these cases not only toward the idea
that payments to the wife in satisfaction of her support and main-
tenance rights should not be taxed, but also toward the notion that
62 Paul Rosenthal, 17 T.C. 1047 (1951), rev'd on other grounds, 205 F.2d 505
(2d Cir. 1953).
63 See note 51 supra. Converse could have been distinguished as there the
wife received an absolute interest in a lump sum, whereas in McLean, the
obligation would cease (defeasible) upon the death of either spouse. Mc-
Lean's obligation was contingent upon survival.
04 11 T.C. 543 (1948). McLean entered into divorce settlement negotiations
with his wife. Resulting agreement provided for lump-sum settlement of
$100,000, payable in monthly installments over a 12 year period. The
agreement was later incorporated into a divorce decree. The agreement
provided that the payments to the wife should continue even if she re-
married, and the obligation was to end upon the death of either party. The
Commissioner said that the portion of the settlement relating to the re-
marriage provision was without adequate consideration. But the Tax
Court held the transfer was in consideration of the release of a presently
enforceable claim.
65 11 T.C. 1016 (1948).
00 176 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1949). Taylor, Federal Gift Tax Aspects of Re-
lease of Dower and Other Marital Rights Under Divorce or Separation
Agreements, 6 S.C.L.Q. 359, 360. (1954).
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perhaps settlement agreements (fulfilling certain conditions) inci-
dent to divorce should also be tax free.
B. 1954 CODE
The concession as to support payments contained in ET 19 is
applicable today when the transfer does not come within the pro-
visions of IRC § 2516. Although ET 19 was not mentioned in the
Proposed U.S. Treas. Regulations under § 25.2516-1, it would still
remain the law as to any transfer not covered by that section, e.g.,
a transfer followed by a divorce after the two-year period. Under
IRC § 2516, it would seem to be important to determine only whether
the payment to the spouse was in settlement of her marital or
property rights and a divorce occurred within two years. One such
right would be the obligation to support and maintain, but it would
be unnecessary for the court to separate and allocate amounts to
these various rights as they would all be exempt if the require-
ments of IRC § 2516 were met [§ 2516 (1)].
One further problem arises when the husband pays the wife's
attorney's fees in the separation or divorce settlement. Is this a
taxable gift? The Commissioner in ET 1967 established the rule that
such payments are not taxable if the husband is under an obliga-
tion to pay the fees. In Nebraska and most other states, such an
obligation exists by statute, 8 and it is therefore logical to assume
that no payment would be taxed. The ET 19 rule would still apply
as IRC § 2516 and its Proposed Regulations do not discuss the matter
of attorney's fees.
III. SUPPORT FOR MINOR CHILDREN
It is clear that property which is transferred by a husband to
discharge his obligation to support his minor children is not a tax-
able gift and is deemed to be "adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth."0' 9 A transfer, however, for the benefit
67 See supra note 54 at 169.
6s Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-308 (Reissue 1952); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 152 Neb.
799, 42 N.W.2d 861 (1950); Lindey, op. cit. supra note 2 at 419, 422.
69Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2516(2) ; Roland M. Hooker, 10 T.C. 388, affd, 174
F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949); Helvering v. U.S. Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1940); Commissioner v. Weiser, 113 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1940); and Mc-
Donald Trust, 19 T.C. 672, affd 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955). Husband has
an obligation to support in Nebraska, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-449 (Re-
issue 1956). Generally on support of children, see Lindey, op. cit. supra
note 2 (1954-1957 Supp.) at 148.
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of adult children is a taxable gift as there is no remaining duty to
support.70 Also, the value of property transferred in excess of that
which is reasonably necessary to discharge the support obligation
is a taxable gift.7 ' In addition, a transfer in discharge of support
obligation which vests in minor children after they have reached
majority would be a taxable gift.7 2
There is a gift tax due on the remainder interest where a trust
is created pursuant to a divorce decree ordering the husband to
establish a trust in support of his wife for life and remainder to his
adult daughter and her children. 73 Here the distinction between
transfers founded on obligations imposed by law and those imposed
by agreement breaks down, and it appears that the support exemp-
tion does not apply to transfers for the benefit of adult offspring.7 4
By the Rosenthal decision7r payments to minors beyond their needs
for support were held taxable. The court found, in this case, that
the particular divorce decree provisions depended wholly on the
consent of the husband and were not the result of court litigation.
In the 1954 code, § 2516 (2) is apparently a codification of the
various court decisions exempting support payments to minor chil-
dren. It provides that reasonable support payments for minor chil-
dren of the marriage are deemed adequate consideration and are
exempt from the gift tax. Here a transfer either presently or in
trust7" is not a taxable gift, but under IRC § 71 (b), the income from
such a trust or property would be taxable to the husband, for the
reason that it satisfies his legal obligation to support his children.77
Also, a trust, created in a separation agreement, for a minor child
is taxable to the extent that the corpus of the trust exceeds a rea-
sonably required amount for support.78 This is true of IRC § 2516
and any amount above the reasonable limit is taxed.
The American Law Institute believes that this subsection of
IRC § 2516 is unnecessary and possibly misleading. The Institute
70 Karl T. Wiedemann, 26 T.C. 565, 569 (1956).
71 Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953).
72 Hooker v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949).
73 Karl Wiedemann, 26 T.C. 565, 569 (1956).
74 Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d at 508.
75 Ibid.
76 U.S. Treas. Reg. 108 § 86.2 (1943); Lewis, Trusts in Divorce Settlements,
Trusts and Estates, Oct., 1956, 884-892.
77Budd v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947).
78T.C. opinion in Converse case, note 51 supra. See also Proposed U.S.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (f) (1) (1957).
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reasons that, "Under prior law, transfers for support of minors were
not subject to gift tax where within the legal obligation of sup-
port; and where in excess thereof were not protected whether or
not contained in a decree of divorce.17
Two questions, however, do arise as to the terms used in the
subsection [§2516 (2) ]. What is meant by the word "minority?" No
definition appears, but perhaps the age should depend upon state
law or some theory of federal common law. Frequently, a minor
is thought to be a male under the age of 21 years, and a female under
the age of 18 years. But would this apply to the gift tax law? Ap-
parently not. Although no definition of minor or minority appears
in IRC § 2516, the word is defined in IRC § 2503 (c) as an ".... indi-
vidual who has not attained the age of 21 years. . . ." Granted that
§ 2503 (c) applies to a determination of when a gift to a minor is to
be considered a future interest; nevertheless it must be taken as
a legislative declaration that for gift tax purposes a minor is either
a male or female under the age of 21 years.
The second problem arises as to the meaning of the term "issue
of the marriage" found in IRC § 2516 (2). Would step-children and
adopted children be considered issue for the purposes of the section,
and therefore would payments to them under a separation settle-
ment incident to a divorce be exempt? The Commissioner has in-
cluded legally adopted children within the meaning of "issue" in
IRC § 2516 (2), and so reasonable payments to them during minority
would be tax free. (Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-2). Pay-
ments to step-children, however, are not freed from the gift tax.
Technically "issue" has been defined as limited to heirs of the body
or as lineal descendants,8 0 and this might be construed to prevent
adopted or step-children from coming within the scope of the word.
But the Commissioner wisely realized that a father who has adopted
a child would have a definite legal duty to support that child upon
a divorce or separation of the parents.
IV. SEPARATION AND DIVORCE AGREEMENTS
What gift tax liability is created when a husband and wife
enter into a separation agreement settling their marital property
rights other than support, and the agreement is approved or in-
corporated into a divorce or separation decree? Here again we will
79 ALl (Tent. Draft No. 10) op. cit. supra note 42 at 108.
80 Black Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951); Wilkins v. Rowan, 107 Neb. 180, 185
N.W. 437 (1921).
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briefly trace the development of the law and then analyze the 1954
Code and its regulations.8 '
A. HIsToRY
The rationale of the early Tax Court decisions, supra, Part II,
was that antenuptial agreements should be taxed as they were
fraught with donative intent and the marriage was just beginning,
whereas divorce settlements should not be taxed as there was more
of an arm's length transaction involved-a type of bargained-for
compromise.8 2 As previously discussed, the Commissioner ex-
empted reasonable support payments in ET 19, supra Part II, but
still maintained that the release of all marital rights other than
the support rights was not consideration and therefore taxable.
A year later, the 2d Circuit in Converse decided that no gift tax
was due where the separation agreement was approved and made
enforceable by the divorce court.8 3 There the agreement was not
conditioned upon the entry of the decree, but the conclusion was
reached at p. 133 that the husband's payment was to satisfy and
discharge a money judgment and so was adequate consideration.
Subsequent Tax Court opinions followed the earlier cases and held
that these transfers were not taxable as long as the agreements
were merged and incorporated into the divorce decrees; even though
the decrees merely approved a prior agreement by the parties.8 4
However, this last mentioned tax court rule was limited and
held inapplicable in Commissioner v. Barnard's Estate,8 5 and Krause
v. Yoke.86 In Barnard's Estate, the 2d Circuit distinguished its pre-
vious decision in Converse and declared that a gift tax was due.
It concluded that there was no adequate consideration where the
divorce court merely approved a property settlement agreement
which provided (a) for transfers before the decree and (b) was
81 For other discussions of the problems herein see Hill, The Present Status
of Alimony Payments, Proc. N.Y.U. 13th Ann. Inst. on Fed. Tax 31 (1955);
Lewis, op. cit. note 76 supra at 887-888; Note, Tax Aspects of Alimony
Trusts, 66 Yale L.J. 881 (1957); and McDonald, Tax Aspects of Divorce,
Separation, Alimony and Support, 17 Univ. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1955).
82 Text at notes 47-53 supra.
83 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1947).
8 4 Wm. B. Harding, 11 T.C. 1051 (1948); Albert V. Moore, 10 T.C. 393 (1948);
Clarence B. Mitchell, 6 T.C. 159 (1946); and Ed. B. McLean, 11 T.C. 543
(1948).
85 See note 66 supra.
86 89 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. W. Va. 1950). This case was decided before the Su-
preme Court decision in Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
COMMENTS
effective without the decree and survived the decree. The Barnard
rule was cited with approval in Krause v. Yoke, where the agree-
ment was completed prior to the entry of the decree and the de-
cree merely recited compliance by the parties and ratified the
agreement. So the decree was not a court command or order for
the parties to obey the agreement.
Up to this time then, three varying rules were established:
(a) The Tax Court rule that payments made incident to a divorce
decree were not taxable because the agreement was made in an
arm's length transaction;8 7 (b) The Converse rule that payments
made under an order of a divorce court were tax free;a8 and (c)
The Barnard's Estate and Krause exceptions cited in the preceding
paragraph.8 9
In 1950, the Supreme Court handed down its first opinion on
the subject of settlement agreements incident to divorce in Harris
v. Commissioner." There the question was raised whether the
Merrill and Wemyss decisions could be applied to impose a gift tax
on a postnuptial property settlement incident to a divorce. Simply
stated, the facts in the Harris case were that a husband and wife
transferred property to each other pursuant to a property settle-
ment agreement conditioned on and subject to the approval of a
final divorce decree. They each released marital rights in the other's
property, and it was provided that the agreement would survive
the divorce decree. The Supreme Court held that there was no gift
tax due as this fransfer was not based on an agreement or promise,
but was pursuant to a court decree. By this decision, the Supreme
Court sustained the Treasury ruling in ET 19,91 and refused to fol-
low the Tax Court's distinction between divorce settlements and
antenuptial agreements.
87Text at notes 47-53 supra.
88 See text at note 83 supra.
89 See also Hooker v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949).
90 340 U.S. 106 (1950). This was a 5-4 opinion. For an excellent discussion,
see Pedrick, Gift Tax Jurisdiction of the Divorce Court, 46 Ill. L. Rev. 177(1951); Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. 743-746; and annotation in 95 L. Ed.
121-141. The court construed Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d
Cir. 1946) to the gift tax field. That case allowed a deduction from the
value of the gross estate of an amount claimed as future payments due
the decedent's divorced wife under a divorce decree incorporating a prior
settlement agreement. The court held that consideration was not involved
as there was no promise or agreement.
91 Actually expanded ET 19 to recognize the immunity of transfers made to
discharge obligations imposed by law.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, recognized a dis-
tinction between transfers founded on obligations imposed by agree-
ment and those imposed by law. As to the former type of voluntary
contractual settlement, he said that unquestionably a gift tax would
be imposed as it was based solely on a promise, while in the latter
case, the decree "creates the rights and the duties" and so no tax
is due (based on the idea of legal compulsion) .92
The difficulty in the Harris case arose from the fact that the
settlement agreement stated that it would survive any divorce de-
cree entered. This provision evidently meant that the parties might
sue to enforce either or both the agreement or the decree. However,
the majority felt that this provision was unimportant saying, "...
that the gift tax statute is concerned with the source of rights, not
with the manner in which rights at some distant time may be en-
forced." In other words, the transfer and not the sanctions involved
was the important thing, and here the transfer was by court decree.9 3
The Harris case has evidently rejected the "Estate Depletion"
theory, supra Part I, and has adopted in its place the idea that the
concept "gift," within the meaning of the gift tax statute, is limited
to voluntary transfers.9 4 It follows, of course, that a transfer which
is based upon a Court decree would not be considered "voluntary."
It should be pointed out at this juncture that the goal of the
Commissioner over the years has been to tax all transfers unsup-
ported by adequate consideration.9 5 Many taxpayers attempted to
meet this approach by arguing that even if no consideration were
present, the transfer must rest upon donative intent before gift tax
liability could be created. The courts, as we have seen, finally re-
jected a possible requirement of donative intent, at least as far as
antenuptial agreements were concerned.9 6 Starting with the Harris
case, however, the Courts have developed this new alternative
(voluntary vs. involuntary), which pays lip service to consideration
but is, in effect, a new testy7 This alternative is the notion that
even though no consideration is present in the transfer, the transfer
92 Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 16 at 320-23.
93 Harris case at 111.
04 Pedrick, op. cit. supra note 90 at 179-180; 66 Yale L.J. op. cit. supra note
37 at 887.
'5 IRC § 2512; see text at notes 13, 55 supra.
96 See text at note 39 supra.
97 340 U.S. at 111.
COMMENTS
must be "voluntary" (pursuant to a promise or agreement) before a
gift tax liability arises. It is true that the courts say the involuntary
transfer is in effect adequate consideration, but, such a definition
of consideration seems rather unconventional, to say the leastf 8
The American Law Institute has concisely stated the present
theory in the following language: "The estate tax permits a de-
cedent to transfer to his spouse up to one-half the value of his
adjusted gross estate tax-free. Divorce, like death, marks a point
at which a marriage is dissolved."99 Hence, it can be argued, the
parties should be allowed some sort of property dividing privilege
at the time of divorce as well as at the time of death. 100 It would
seem that when the courts discuss the problem, and conclude that
transfers incident to or incorporated into divorce decrees are not
taxable as they are involuntary, they actually mean that a legal
dissolution of a marriage is a proper time for allowing the parties
to make a tax-free property division.
To be logically consistent with the Estate Tax statute,"0 per-
haps all transfers (antenuptial and ante-divorce), in settlement of
marital property rights, should be subject to the gift tax with an
allowance of the marital deduction to each settlement. Thereby
only one-half of each transfer would be subject to the gift tax,
and the minimum social need for protection of the family unit
would be met-yet the government would receive some revenue.
The Harris doctrine has been broadened or distinguished in
several subsequent cases:
(a) McMurty v. Commissioner.0 2 Husband and wife executed
a separation agreement and it was later incorporated in a divorce
decree. The agreement was effective irrespective of divorce and
was not conditioned upon entry of a divorce decree. However
transfers were not to be made until after the divorce decree ap-
proving the settlement. The court held that no gift tax was due as
this was not a voluntary agreement (p. 662) and the Harris rule
was limited to include "All transfers... in contemplation of divorce
98 Id. at 112.
09 ALI (Tent. Draft No. 10) op. cit. supra note 42 at 104.
100 Ibid.
101 IRC § 2056.
102 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953). The court seemed to emphasize the fact that
the motivating principle of the transfer was the power of the court to
make a property settlement in lieu of and in spite of the voluntary ar-
rangement of the parties. Cf. Commissioner v. Blum, 187 F.2d 177 (7th
Cir. 1951). For two other cases discussing Harris, see Ruby G. Grigg, 20
T.C. 420 (1953); and Estate of Chester H. Bowers, 23 T.C. 911 (1955).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and executed after approval of the divorce court having jurisdic-
tion...."
(b) Rosenthal v. Commissioner.10 3 Here the rationale of the
Harris case was held inapplicable to a divorce decree ordering pay-
ments to adult offspring or to minors beyond their needs. The court
felt that this would be carrying the "involuntary" argument too
far. It was also thought important that the state court have the
duty to make an equitable distribution of the property involved.10 4
(c) Hardenbergh v. Commissioner.10 5 The wife and daughter
renounced their statutory interests in the estate of the father in
favor of the son. Probate court awarded the intestate's property to
the son. The court ruled that the Harris doctrine does not apply
and a gift tax was due. The source of the son's rights, pursuant to
local law, came from the acts of the wife and daughter in renouncing
their shares, and so the probate court's decree was conditioned on
the consent of the wife and daughter.
(d) Chase Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner.0 6 A trust for the bene-
fit of children executed in connection with and embodied in the
divorce decree was not entitled to the same construction as a settle-
ment of property interests under the Harris rule. The court held
that the assets of the trust on the death of the husband were in-
cludible in his gross estate.
(e) The rule in the Harris case has also been applied to § 812 (b)
of the federal estate tax statute [former version of IRC § 2043 (b) ]JOT
103 205 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 1953).
104 Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F. 2d 131, 136 (9th Cir. 1955), held that
where there is a mere private agreement between the parties and oper-
ative only by that agreement, a gift tax is due.
105 198 F.2d 63, 67 (8th Cir. 1952).
106 225 F.2d 621, 626 (8th Cir. 1955).
107 Bank of N.Y. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 375, 383 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
Held that a separation agreement between husband and wife under which
the wife was given certain life insurance policies and which was binding
and enforceable regardless of any later divorce decree, was not found on
adequate consideration in money or money's worth within § 812 (b). The
court construed Harris to require the transfer to be effected by the di-
vorce decree in order for tax relief to apply. Commissioner v. Watson,
216 F.2d 941, 943 (2nd Cir. 1954). Here a separation agreement provided
that it would survive the divorce decree and be the "sole measure of
financial obligation" regardless of provisions of divorce decree. Later
it was incorporated into a divorce decree. Wife claimed amount under
the agreement was not includible in the gross estate of her former hus-
band. Held for the taxpayer-broadly construing Harris and McA urty
cases.
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B. 1954 CODE
The 1954 Code contains a new provision for gift tax exemption
of certain property settlements relating to divorce."s The general
rule under IRC § 2512 is that transfers in settlement of dower,
curtesy, or other statutory property rights are not made for ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth and are
therefore taxable.10 9 But such a transfer is exempt from tax if it
fulfills the requirements of IRC § 2516 or the Proposed U.S. Treas.
Regs. § 25.2516-1 (c). This section provides in effect that written
marital and property settlement agreements between husband and
wife are regarded to be made "for full and adequate consideration in
money or money's worth," if a final decree of divorce is obtained
within two years thereafter. The gift tax immunity of the section
also includes transfers of property to provide "reasonable" support
allowances for minor children of the marriage. (§ 2516 (2) discussed
supra Part III.) It is to be noted that as of the date of this writing,
IRC § 2516 has not been interpreted by any of the courts.
Fortunately, IRC § 2516 has eliminated certain superficial tests
formerly used by the courts. 10 The drafters of this section attempted
to remove from consideration any argument as to (a) donative in-
tent, (b) bona fide transaction, (c) adequate consideration, (d)
arm's length transaction, (e) ordinary course of business, and (f)
involuntary transaction. Here the gift tax exemption is not de-
pendent upon whether the divorce decree approved or incorporated
the antecedent property settlement agreement, and actually the
agreement need not even be submitted to the divorce court for
approval. The only criterion now applied is that a divorce occurs
some time within two years after the agreement has been made,
and this two-year requirement is merely to insure that the settle-
ment is legally binding and not a method for tax avoidance. Of
course, if there is no divorce, then IRC § 2516 is inapplicable, and
the transfer would be taxable as a gift under IRC § 2501 and § 2512.
It can be stated unequivocally that the section makes no dis-
tinction as to who obtains the divorce or for that matter to whom
the money or property is paid. IRC § 2516 would seem to apply to
both lump sum and periodic payments under the settlement agree-
ment. Happily for the taxpayer, the agreement may be drawn and
'
03 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 2516; Lowndes & Kramer op. cit. supra note 16
at 746; Kutz, op. cit. supra note 10 at 441-444.
109 Proposed U.S. Treas. Regulations, § 25.2512-8 and § 25.2516-1 (a) (1957).
110 Harris case note 90 supra; Powell, op. cit. supra note 1 at 784. However,
the drafters of the Regulations were very adept at including certain
other superficial tests.
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executed prior to the divorce decree and before the bonds of matri-
mony have been severed. Naturally, the provisions of IRC § 2516
are applicable only to transfers of property made after January 1,
1955.111
True it is that there are many reasons why people desire to
make property settlement agreements prior to divorce; however,
four such reasons are readily apparent from the cases: (a) As an
actual bargained compromise, (b) As adequate compensation for
expected inheritance rights, (c) As a generosity settlement, or (d)
As a ransom settlement through which one spouse forces the other
to purchase his freedom. The provision (§ 2516) is apparently a leg-
islative recognition that a divorce is not always a family-type trans-
action including donative intent, but more often includes many of
the same elements as an arm's length business transaction and is
made under the cloud of an impending family upheaval. The draft-
ers of IRC § 2516 decided that whatever the reason or motive for
the transfer was, it should be exempt from taxation.
One question arises as to the meaning of the word "spouse" in
IRC § 2516 (1). It would seem that persons who are legally separated
are still spouses while those who are divorced are not. Persons
would still be technically married even after the entry of an inter-
locutory decree,1 12 and until the decree becomes final.
Second, would it still be important that the divorce court have
jurisdiction and authority by state law to make a distribution of
the parties' property rights? No, since IRC § 2516 does not require
that the settlement agreement be submitted to the divorce court
for approval, the court's authority would not be a determining fac-
tor. However, the court must have had jurisdiction over the parties
in order for the decree to be valid and binding. On the other hand,
transfers made in fulfillment of the requirements of Proposed U.S.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-1 (c) would be effective only if the court had
jurisdiction and authority by state law to make equitable distribu-
tions of property. Here the difference is based on the language of
the Proposed Regulation that the transfer must be made pursuant
to, binding upon, and incorporated in the decree. [Reg. § 25.2516-1
(c) I.
11 Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 2501.
112 Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 2513 (a) (1); Commissioner v. Eccles, 208 F.2d 796
(4th Cir. 1954); and Evans v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 378 (10th Cir.
1954). The Commissioner has taken the contrary position for income tax.
Rev. Rul. 55-178 (CB 1955-1, 322); Keezer, Marriage and Divorce, 305
(3d ed. 1946).
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Lastly, would the Government be able to question the amount
agreed upon in the settlement agreement as being in excess of
legal requirements? Yes, it seems that the words "pursuant to"
contained in IRC § 2516 were intended ". . . to restrict amounts
which can be transferred tax-free."113 The American Law hustitute
has taken the position that this provision was unnecessary as it is
highly ". . . unlikely that more than one-half of the transferor's
property will be turned over to his spouse on the occasion of a
divorce .... "114
Recently the Commissioner has had an opportunity to interpret
IRC § 2516 in connection with a trust (Rev. Rul. 57-506 I.R.B. 1957,
44, p. 10, issued Nov. 4, 1957). Advice was requested on the follow-
ing facts: A husband and wife entered into a property settlement
agreement pursuant to a divorce, by which the husband transferred
irrevocably certain preferred stock to a bank as trustee for the wife.
The wife was to receive the entire trust income (with certain upper
limits) for life or until remarriage. After her death or remarriage,
the trust terminated and the corpus was to be paid over to a char-
itable organization. The Commissioner held that the provisions of
§ 2516 applied and that there was no gift tax due as to the wife's
income from the trust. Here the wife was the beneficial owner of
the life interest and the agreement was within the requirements of
IRC § 2516.115
By way of summary, therefore, it is necessary that the follow-
ing requirements be fulfilled in order that a property settlement in-
cident to divorce will come within the provisions of IRC § 2516:
(a) There must be a written agreement.
(b) The agreement must concern marital or property rights.
(c) The divorce must occur within two years after the agree-
ment.
(d) The transfer must be pursuant to the settlement agree-
ment.
(e) The transfer must be made to a spouse for settlement of
property or marital rights, or reasonable support allowance
for minor children of the marriage.116
113 ALI (Tent. Draft 10) op. cit. supra note 42 at 108.
114 Ibid.
115 See discussion of beneficial ownership in Id. at 105.
116 Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 16 at 317. Curiously enough, it
would seem that an antenuptial agreement would fit these tests if fol-
lowed by a divorce within two years.
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C. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IRC § 2516
It is interesting to note certain aspects of the legislative history
of IRC § 2516. The House Report accompanying H.R. No. 8300
(House version of IRC 1954) stated that:
Under present law property settlements between spouses are
not regarded as taxable gifts if the property settlement is incorpor-
ated in the decree of divorce. However, the gift tax status under
present law of settlements not incorporated in the decree of divorce
is uncertain. The bill provides that property settlements involving
transfers between spouses are not to constitute taxable gifts if fol-
owed by a divorce within a reasonable time.117 [Emphasis added.]
Obviously, therefore, the purpose of the House bill was to clarify
the law concerning transfers not incorporated in the divorce decree
and make them exempt if followed by a divorce within a reasonable
time. The drafters wished to remove the incorporation or approval
test of Harris. This bill was passed by the House and sent to the
Senate.118
Following the usual practice on Revenue Bills, the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance held numerous hearings on the House bill during
the spring of 1954, and many written reports and letters were sub-
mitted to the Committee proposing modifications and changes to
the House version.
One such report was presented by the Committee on Taxation
of the New York City Bar Association.'1 9 This comprehensive study
proposed several changes to the House draft and in connection with
IRC § 2516 stated:
... the provisions for a divorce occurring 'vithin a reasonable time'
after the agreement of settlement would give rise to extensive liti-
gation on the question of what is a 'reasonable time.' In the circum-
stances, it is suggested that a stated period of say two or five years
be placed in the statute. 20
Apparently the Senate Committee believed that the New York City
Bar Committee was correct (as this was the only discussion of IRC
§ 2516 contained in the Hearing Reports), and in its report on the
bill to the Senate said that the term "reasonable time" would be too
indefinite, create uncertainty in the law and lead to protracted liti-
117 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 94 A323 (1954); Senate Finance
Committee, Hearings on IRC 1954, pt. I p. 76; U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News, 1954, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 4467.
118 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 128 (1954).
119 First Report on H.R. No. 8300 by the N.Y. City Bar Assoc., Committee on
Taxation, p. 73-74 (April 8, 1954), contained in Hearings on IRC 1954,
Senate Committee on Finance, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess., Pt. I pp 580-581.
120 Ibid.
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gation.121 The Committee proposed that the period be set at two
years for allowance of gift tax exemption. 122 The other amendment
concerned the House provision that IRC § 2516 would apply to writ-
ten agreements relative to marital and property rights incident to
the divorce. Both the reasonable time and the incident to divorce
provisions were eliminated by the Senate and the House agreed. 123
D. SITUATIONS WHEE § 2516 DOES NOT APPLY
(a) The provision is inapplicable to transfers made in years
prior to January 1, 1955, the effective date of the 1954 Code for
gift tax purposes. (IRC § 2501). Since there was no previous ver-
sion of IRC § 2516 in the 1939 Code, the Harris case and other re-
lated cases discussed supra apply.
(b) Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-1 (c) provides for gift
tax exemption even when a transfer by a property settlement agree-
ment does not qualify under IRC § 2516, ". . . if the transfer is
effected by a court decree rather than by a promise or agreement
between the spouses." (Emphasis added.) In defining the term
"effected by a court decree" the Regulation states:
A transfer is deemed to be effected by a decree if: (i) the
transfer is pursuant to an agreement which is binding only upon
the entry of a decree of divorce, separate maintenance, or annul-
ment, and such decree is subsequently granted incorporating the
terms of the agreement, or (ii) the transfer is solely pursuant to a
divorce, separation, maintenance, or annulment decree as, for ex-
ample, where there has been no prior out-of-court agreement be-
tween the spouses. [Emphasis added.]
This regulation incorporates the rule of the Harris case, with the
modification that the decree must be the operative fact, and slightly
broadens the harsh limits set forth in IRC § 2516. It would appear
that the two-year limit is not applicable as long as the transfer is
pursuant to, binding upon, and incorporated in the decree.
Formerly property settlements in connection with separate
maintenance and annulment decrees did not qualify for gift tax
121 U.S. Code, Cong. & Admin. News, 1954 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 5125.
122 Ibid.
123 Amendment No. 281 to the IRC 1954, H. Conf. Rep. No. 2543, 83rd Cong.
2d Sess. 75, and contained in U.S. Code & Admin. News, 1954, 83rd Cong.
2d Sess. at 5337: '"This amendment strikes from section 2516 of the House
bill the provision that the section will not apply unless the property
settlement was incident to divorce, and substitutes for the provision
that the property settlement must be followed by divorce 'within a rea-
sonable time' a provision that the divorce must occur within 2 years.
The House recedes."
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exemption and IRC § 2516 is expressly limited to divorce settle-
ments. Both the American Law Institute and the Committee on
Taxation of the New York City Bar Association have criticized
IRC § 2516 for its failure to include separation and annulment trans-
fers.1 24
Apparently, the above regulation is a partial agreement on the
part of the Commissioner with the position of these critics of IRC
§ 2516. For by the terms of subsection (c), transfers under separate
maintenance and annulment decrees may also have tax exemption
if they are made strictly pursuant to, binding upon, and incorpor-
ated in the decree. In other words, if the decree is the operative
fact and the agreement has no extra-judicial force, it will also be
exempt from the gift tax. However, the meaning of the words
"pursuant to" and "binding upon" are vague and uncertain and
could lead to extensive litigation and judicial construction.
There seems to be no valid reason why annulment and separa-
tion agreements should be subjected to a more strict set of require-
ments than divorce agreements. One argument is that the possi-
bility of reconciliation exists in separation, but the American Law
Institute has pointed out that, "Separation or annulment would seem
to be as appropriate a time for a tax-free settlement as divorce,
however, since the possibility of reconciliation exists in all
events."' 25 Moreover, the marital deduction provision in IRC § 2056
allows the husband to leave one-half of his remaining property to
his wife when the marriage is terminated by death without the
imposition of an estate tax. The notion seems to be that if a tax is
not levied on transfers under legal separation agreements, the par-
ties would or could reunite, and then the husband at his death could
effect another tax-free transfer by bequeathing one-half of his re-
maining property to his wife under IRC § 2056. But this could also
be true of a divorce situation for the parties would be perfectly able
to remarry.126 The only necessary requirement for gift tax exemp-
tion should be that the parties have formalized their intention to
dissolve the marriage by having a court enter a decree of divorce,
separation or annulment within a certain period of time.
124 ALI op. cit. supra note 42 at 108. The Committee on Taxation of the
N.Y. City Bar Assoc. note 119 supra, stated: "Many couples, particu-
larly those of advanced years, do not desire a divorce, but instead live
apart. It would seem, therefore, that provision should be made for a
transfer free of gift tax if a decree of divorce or a decree of separation
is entered."
125 ALI op. cit. supra note 42 at 108.
126 66 Yale L.J. supra note 87 at 888.
COMMENTS
Many other reasons have been offered to show that separation
and annulment agreements should be given the same treatment as
divorce agreements. The consideration is much the same, being an
arm's length transaction between the parties in terminating their
marital relationship. The policy of the court is the same in these
cases, looking to the protection of the standard of living of the
wife and children and the ability of the husband to pay. It recog-
nizes that women after years at home are often ill-fitted and unpre-
pared for other vocations. The distinction would also penalize
members of certain religious faiths in that they are unable to ob-
tain divorces, but are permitted to obtain legal separations.127 A
further argument is made that a legal separation decree does not
terminate the wife's inheritance rights in her husband's property,
but the fact remains that most separation agreements would pro-
vide for the compensation and satisfaction of such rights.12
(c) The above quoted Regulation [25.2516-1 (c) (ii) I also ex-
empts transfers made either contemporaneously with a decree of
divorce, separation, maintenance, or annulment or subsequently to
the decree if made "solely pursuant to" the decree. So the Com-
missioner takes the position that there need be no prior agreement
between the parties, and the gift tax exemption will apply when
the property settlement is litigated in court. This would truly be
an example of an involuntary agreement enforced by command of
the court. Here again the words "pursuant to" are ambiguous and
may lead to confusion among the courts as to their actual meaning
and intent.
(d) Although not mentioned in the proposed regulations, ET
19 would still be applicable to transfers founded on a promise or
agreement and to allocations between marital and support rights
for transfers not mentioned in IRC § 2516 or its Proposed Regula-
tions.
(e) Where for some reason the settlement agreement does not
come within the terms of either the statute or the Proposed Regu-
lations, the Commissioner, in all probability, will declare a gift tax
due. Although it may be illogical to say that § 2516 and its regula-
tions are intended to be exclusive, it is submitted that this would
be the Commissioner's contention and his position would be firmly
supported by the apparent inclusion of the Harris rule and a limited
127 Encyclical Letter, Pope Pius XI, 1930, contained in Selected Essays on
Family Law, Association of American Law Schools, 1950, pp. 132-172,
at 157.
128 2 Vernier, American Family Law 482 (1932).
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separation and annulment exemption into the regulations. 129 How-
ever, the gift tax may be greatly minimized if the agreement is exe-
cuted and the transfer occurs prior to the entry of the divorce, sep-
aration, or annulment decree. Then the parties would still be
"spouses" at the time of the transfer, and might use the marital de-
duction provisions of IRC § 2523. This section provides that trans-
fers of property to a spouse are eligible for the marital deduction,
and a tax would be levied on one-half of the value of the property
transferred instead of the full value. Further, the transferor's gift
tax may be reduced by using the $3,000 annual exclusion of IRC §
2503 and the special $30,000 specific exemption of IRC § 2521.
In conclusion, there are only three methods by which a property
settlement agreement incident to divorce or separation can escape
the gift tax. The transfer must come within the provisions of (a)
IRC § 2516, (b) Reg. § 25.2516-1 (c) (i), or (c) Reg. § 25.2516-1 (c)
(ii). The Harris rule would seem to have no effect except as it has
been incorporated into the Regulations, and as to transfers prior to
the 1954 Code. It is important that the attorney choose the method
which is best suited to the needs and abilities of his client, and then
carry out the plan by following both the letter and the spirit of the
statute and the regulations. The ambiguous phrases in the statute
and the regulations should be construed strictly in order to protect
the client's interest and to avoid unnecessary litigation.
William E. Mooney, Jr., '58
129 Powell, op. cit. supra note 1 at 784-85.
